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ABSTRACT	
  
THE INFLUENCE OF ANGER ON IMPLICIT BIASES
Katherine Reiter, B.A.
Marquette University, 2013

Interpretation of ambiguous information is influenced by anxious (Richards,
Reynolds, & French, 1992) and depressive (Wisco, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010)
symptoms. Emotion regulation strategies, and in particular, cognitive reappraisal has
shown to be effective at reducing feelings of distress (Denson, Grisham, & Moulds,
2011). The current study seeks to understand the extent that emotion regulation can
influence interpretation bias, thoughts and behaviors. In the current study, participants
underwent both Angry and Neutral mood inductions. For each mood condition,
participants were instructed to cognitively reappraise and attend to their emotions.
Participants rated the degree of negative affect they experienced, and completed 6
sentence completion items to assess interpretation bias. Results indicated that participants
exhibited an increased negative interpretation bias in the Angry condition relative to
baseline. Following reappraisal, participants rated less negative affect in the Angry
condition. Though, reappraisal did not change interpretation bias. However, self-report
data indicated that individuals who tend to struggle to engage in emotion regulation
techniques and those who endorsed higher levels of state anger, both showed greater
negative affect following cognitive reappraisal and an increased negativity bias.
Participants who reported that they engaged in cognitive reappraisal during the mood
induction, exhibited an increased positivity bias. Results from this study indicate that
cognitive reappraisal is an effective strategy to reduce feelings of negativity in an angry
mood state, however, participants are still at risk for displaying a negative interpretation
bias to ambiguous information.
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I. INTRODUCTION

	
  
	
  

Individuals frequently encounter and manage ambiguous situations in everyday
life. Whether it be hearing a noise in the middle of the night or deciding to report
suspicious luggage at an airport, the way individuals interpret and respond to ambiguity is
partly impacted by the emotions they experience (Andrade & Ariely, 2009), and partly by
the way they manage their emotions (Barazzone & Davey, 2009). When individuals are
prone to respond to ambiguity in a certain way (i.e. positive or negative), it is known as
an interpretation bias (Huppert, Foa, Furr, Filip, & Mathews, 2003). Understanding the
interaction between emotional state, interpretation bias, and emotion regulation is a
highly relevant topic that can aid in understanding the ways individuals manage everyday
life and perhaps help to understand the facets that lead to both adaptive and maladaptive
behavior in individuals.
There are several different forms of interpretation biases, including threat bias,
negative bias, and more. These different biases are indicative of cognitive processes that
maintain certain psychopathologies, such as general anxiety (Richards, Reynolds, &
French, 1992; Wilson, MacLeod, Mathews, & Rutherford, 2006) social anxiety (Franklin,
Huppert, Langner, Leiberg, & Foa, 2005; Huppert et al., 2007), and depression (Everaert,
2012). Those who display such biases are more likely to interpret ambiguous information
as negative or threatening, thus increasing the likelihood that they misinterpret a situation
and behave in maladaptive ways. Further, these biases are likely to be indicative of other
cognitive processes that reinforce maladaptive cognitions. For example, Wisco et al.
(2010) provided a set of situations to their participants (e.g. You called a friend and left a
message asking to get together. Several days pass and you have not heard from this
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friend). They then instructed depressed and non-depressed participants to think of several
explanations for each situation and select the one that most likely fit. Results from this
study revealed that depressed participants were more likely to generate and select
negative interpretations for each scenario. The authors posit that generating and selecting
negative responses reinforced maladaptive thinking that aids in the maintenance of
depressive symptoms.
To examine interpretation bias in laboratory settings, researchers often utilize
homograph tasks (Hertel & El-Messidi, 2006; Richards, Reynolds, & French, 1992), or
sentence completion paradigms (Barton, Morley, Bloxham, Kitson, & Platts, 2005;
Huppert, Pasupuleti, Foa, & Mathews, 2007; White, Suway, Pine, Bar-Haim, & Fox,
2011). Homograph tasks are usually introduced as spelling tasks. They begin by orally
presenting a list of words that have multiple meanings of different valences (e.g. die/dye).
The participant is then instructed to spell the word, which allows investigators to see the
lexical interpretation of the word and thus the participant’s interpretation bias. The
advantage to this model is that this task is a straightforward and automatic assessment of
interpretation bias, however, it does not allow researchers to account for the participant’s
common lexical usage. For example, in the previous example, if the participant is
someone who has an interest in hair styling, results could be confounded by her/his
lexical usage and does not provide accurate information regarding the presence or
absence of an interpretation bias.
Sentence completion paradigms are also used to assess interpretation bias. For
example, Huppert et al. (2007), measured threat interpretations in socially anxious
individuals by presenting participants with ambiguous sentences that have the last word
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missing. Participants were asked to generate responses to disambiguate the sentence.
Across similar studies, participants who were high in social anxiety were more likely to
respond with negative or anxious answers than participants who were low in social
anxiety, which is indicative of an interpretation bias (Franklin, Huppert, Langner,
Leiberg, & Foa, 2005; Wisco, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010). Thus, sentence completion
tasks were effective in identifying interpretation biases in this population. The advantage
of this type of task is that it allows for investigators to control the context of a situation.
For example, using homographs can be susceptible to a participant’s lexical bias as in the
previous example (a hairdresser spelling dye/die). But, an item from a sentence
completion task might read, “Jenna found a stray kitten that was sick, she nursed the
animal overnight and thinks it will likely _____”. In the latter example, the participant
will not be confused about the lexical usage of the words and results will be more
indicative of a true interpretation bias.
Several studies have found that transient emotional states also influence
interpretation bias (Barazzone & Davey, 2009; Berna, Lang, Goodwin, & Holmes, 2011;
Gorn, Pham, & Sin, 2001). Barazzone and Davey (2009) induced angry, anxious, happy,
or neutral mood states using guided imagery vignettes and music. Researchers gave
participants a homophone spelling task and found that individuals who were in angry or
anxious mood states were more likely to endorse the threatening version of the
homophone as compared to participants who were induced to be in happy or neutral
mood states. These results remained significant after controlling for trait anxiety and
anger, suggesting that transient emotions play a large role in assessing ambiguous stimuli,
even after accounting for emotional traits.
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Transient moods and interpretation bias are also found to play a role in real-world
applicable situations. For example, Gorn et al. (2001) asked participants to rate
advertisements that had an ambiguous tone following pleasant or unpleasant mood
inductions. Results showed that individuals who were induced in a pleasant mood rated
the ambiguous advertisements as more positive when in a pleasant mood. As such, the
literature shows that transient emotions influence the resolution of ambiguity both in
terms of lexical disambiguation and object evaluation.
In general, emotions give us information regarding a situation to aid in the
decision-making process (Gross & Thompson, 2007). However, relying on dysregulated
emotions to aid in the decision making process can result in poor choices (FentonO’Creevy, Soane, Nicholson, & Willman, 2010). For instance, affect and decision
making have been examined in risky behaviors (excessive gambling, reckless driving,
etc.) and in efficacy of decision making (i.e. money earned in a gambling task)
(Blanchette & Richards, 2010). Researchers found that feelings of anxiety guide us to
avoid risk (Blanchette & Richards, 2010), while anger makes us perceive risk as less
likely and we thus make risky decisions (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Research has shown
that anger is a particularly complex emotion in terms of decision making. Specifically,
Anger guides individuals to feel negative about their past, optimistic about the future, and
pessimistic in the intentions of others. Such individuals experience more confidence and
thus are unlikely to generate alternative decisions, and lack the ability to approach a
situation with rationality and objectivity (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006), thus putting these
individuals at higher risk for making maladaptive decisions.
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Emotion regulation is an important process that allows us to manage our emotions
to a wide variety of stimuli (Gross, 2002). Emotion regulation may involve increasing,
decreasing or maintaining an emotional response and is usually consistent with an
individual’s goals and expectations for a given situation (Gyurak, Gross, & Etkin, 2011;
(Gross & Thompson, 2007). There are several benefits to successful emotion regulation.
For example, emotion regulation permits individuals to convey desired information to
others regarding internal states and to behave within social norms (Gross & Thompson,
2007). Consequently, individuals who successfully regulate their emotions tend to
experience a higher quality of social relationships than those who do not (Lopes et al.,
2011). In addition to social functioning, Gross and John (2003) found that individuals
who engage in successful emotion regulation techniques tend to be more optimistic,
experience greater satisfaction in life, and have higher self-esteem than those who do not
engage in effective emotion regulation techniques.
There are several different strategies that can be implemented to regulate
emotions; however, not all strategies are equally successful in changing the impact of the
emotional experience. The following is a discussion of these emotion regulation
strategies, beginning with the least effective. ‘Situation selection’ occurs at the beginning
of the emotion generative process, and is the process by which individuals choose to
avoid settings that are likely to produce unwanted emotions (Gross & Thompson, 2007).
Implementation of this strategy requires the ability to predict the timing and specific
unwanted emotions that a situation might evoke. This strategy is healthy and protective in
the short-term, however, when using this strategy regularly, situations that should be
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eventually confronted are ignored, thus making this a maladaptive long-term emotion
regulation strategy (Gross & Thompson, 2007).
Situation selection is an antecedent-focused emotion regulation strategy, but other
strategies attempt to manage affect once an emotional event has been experienced.
‘Behavioral Suppression’ is a strategy that occurs at the end of the emotion generative
process, after the emotion is experienced. This strategy works to inhibit behavioral and
physiological responses to the emotion (Sheppes & Gross, 2011). This strategy is often
adaptive in social situations (Haga, Kraft, & Corby, 2009) in which it is important to
inhibit the communication of certain emotions and reactions that are counterproductive to
one’s goals. For example, when sitting in a professional meeting and an unfavorable
decision has been made, it is important to manage emotions in a way that maintains
professional demeanor in this setting. The use of response modulation would conceal
initial feelings of anger that may arise by sitting still with a calm facial expression,
instead of shouting in frustration. Unlike situation selection, with response modulation,
the individual experiences the emotion. However similar to situation selection, several
negative outcomes related to suppression have been recorded. In particular, this strategy
is thought to be highly taxing, as it requires a great deal of cognitive resources (Sheppes
& Gross, 2011). Suppression is associated with poor memory and high physiological
arousal. Further, the negative emotion is still experienced, just the expression has
changed (Sheppes & Gross, 2011). Moreover, it has been shown that individuals who
habitually engage in Suppression have negative well-being outcomes, such as depressed
mood, negative affect and less satisfaction with life (Haga et al., 2009).
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Where situation selection occurs prior to the elicited emotion, and response
modulation occurs at the end of the emotion experience, cognitive reappraisal is a
technique that takes place during the emotional experience. The aforementioned
strategies are useful in controlling exposure to emotions and communication of emotional
states; however neither effectively manages the internal experience of emotion. On the
other hand, cognitive reappraisal is a method used to change the perception of an
emotional stimulus to alter its impact on an individual (Gross & Thompson, 2007).
While this strategy is understood to mean that the individual changes their
perception of a situation, it has been interpreted in several ways. In one study,
participants engaged in cognitive reappraisal while watching a distressing film.
Instructions encouraged participants to take a detached and unemotional approach to the
film that would remove the emotional context in order to decrease the degree of negative
emotion they felt (Gross, 1998). However, another study examining cognitive reappraisal
worded the instructions differently. Specifically, participants were shown negative
pictures and instructed to reinterpret it to be less negative (Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, &
Gabrieli, 2002). While these studies may have inadvertently encouraged participants to
utilize different strategies, both studies found that participants who reappraised their
emotions reported a decrease in negative affect compared to trials where they did not
implement cognitive reappraisal.
Despite the efficacy of decreasing negative affect with both instruction types,
differences in experimental procedures within the literature complicate the definition of
cognitive reappraisal, such that different instructions may lead researchers to study
different emotion regulation processes with the same name. For example, in the study by
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Ochsner et al. (2002) where participants reappraised negative images using explanations,
any positive association they generate may encourage them to reinterpret negative stimuli
as more positive as opposed to less negative. Both processes technically fall under the
premise of cognitive reappraisal, such that the interpretation of the event is changed, but
the studies use different processes. McRae, Ciesielski, and Gross (2012) highlight the
issues of using instructions that encourage participants to increase positive emotions and
decrease negative emotions under the same construct. In this study, participants were
asked to reappraise their emotions toward negative pictures by either increasing their
positive emotions or decreasing their negative emotions. Results showed that participants
reported less negative affect and showed less of a decrease in skin conductance in the
increase positive emotion condition compared to participants in the decrease negative
emotions group. Results indicated that ‘increase positive’ was associated with greater
reduction of subjective ratings of negative affect, but fewer physiological changes, which
indicates that this strategy was not effective at reducing physiological arousal associated
with negative emotions. In contrast, ‘decrease negative’ was associated with both
subjective decrease in negative affect, and a decrease in physiological arousal. This study
shows that different instruction types have different affective and physiological
consequences.
Given the aforementioned findings, the current study defines cognitive reappraisal
as reinterpreting the content of negative stimuli to be less negative. An example of this
strategy is when an individual, who is nervous about receiving an injection due to a fear
of needles, reinterprets the situation as a short, standardized procedure with minimal
risks. Ray, Ochsner, McCrae, and Gross (2010) demonstrated the benefit of this strategy.
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In this study, participants viewed pictures that were negative in valence and high in
arousal. Participants were instructed to reframe their thoughts to either increase or
decrease their negative feelings, or just attend to the content of the picture. The authors
found that the cognitive reappraisal technique used to minimize negative feelings
successfully decreased negative emotions compared to trials where participants were
asked to increase their emotional responses.
The current study focused on cognitive reappraisal and interpretation bias in
angry mood states. Anger has been found to be associated with several psychopathologies
including depression (Pasquini, Picardi, Biondi, Gaetano, & Morosini, 2004), social
anxiety (Erwin, Heimberg, Schneier, & Liebowitz, 2003), and eating disorders (Waller et
al., 2003). Anger is also implicated in negative health outcomes. Specifically, Denollet,
Gidron, Vrints, and Conraads (2010) found that suppressed anger was associated with
more serious cardiac events than the presence of anger alone. Other research has shown
that anger influences biological mechanisms on a more cellular level. For example,
Gouin, Kiecolt-Glaser, Malarkey, and Glaser (2008), found that individuals who had high
levels of anger control, were likely to experience a shorter duration of blister healing,
than those who were low in anger control. Further, the majority of these studies have
discussed that greater than the presence of anger alone, anger dysregulation is associated
with poorer outcomes (Erwin et al., 2003; Waller et al., 2003; Denollet et al., 2010;
Gouin et al., 2008).
Previous literature has found that emotion regulation, and in particular, cognitive
reappraisal is effective in regulating explicit ratings of anger (Ray, Wilhelm, & Gross,
2008; Scasz, Szentagotai, & Hofmann, 2011) and results in better cardiovascular
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responses (Mauss, Cook, Cheng, & Gross, 2007). While these studies are encouraging,
there are no known studies that examine anger regulation and interpretation bias together.
What has been established is the ability to manipulate interpretation bias (Wilson et al.,
2006). . In an experimental paradigm, the researchers trained healthy participants to use a
threatening or nonthreatening interpretation of stimuli. Participants then watched an
anxiety-inducing video clip. Results indicated that participants who were induced to have
a threatening interpretation bias rated significantly more anxiety and depression from
before and after the film clip, compared to participants with a nonthreatening
interpretation bias. This study indicates that interpretation bias can play a causal role in
distressing symptoms. Further, that it can be induced indicates that perhaps we can also
systematically change the interpretation bias, using emotion regulation strategies, to
decrease the distressing emotion. Another example that interpretation bias is can be
manipulated comes from a study demonstrating that social phobics displayed greater
negative interpretation bias than treated social phobics who had greater bias than
controls. (Franklin et al., 2010) This finding demonstrates that interpretation bias is
correlated with changes in cognitions and behaviors.
Through examining interpretation bias in conjunction with cognitive reappraisal,
we can examine the extent that emotion regulation influences the interpretation of
ambiguity. Specifically, if results indicate that angry participants display a negative
interpretation bias, however, following cognitive reappraisal, the interpretation bias
becomes more neutral or positive, we can then conclude that individuals who regulate
their emotions subjectively feel less negative, and further, respond to ambiguity similar to
individuals in more neutral mood states.
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As such, if we can better understand the regulation of anger, it would help guide
treatment in a variety of psychopathologies and inform health outcomes. An advantage to
the current study design, is that mood manipulations will take the form of
autobiographical recall, which allows us to directly examine the efficacy of emotion
regulation techniques on managing emotions from life events, similar to what is
experienced in a therapeutic setting.
A. Specific Aims
The present study aims to address four specific facets of emotion regulation and the
interpretation of ambiguous information.
1. To determine whether mood impacts interpretation bias, we will evaluate the
effect of angry and neutral mood on a sentence completion task. Mood-based
interpretation bias will be established if the valence of the responses on the
sentence completion task between angry and neutral states is significantly
different. We hypothesize that participants will choose more negative answers
following the angry mood induction than following the neutral mood induction.
2. To assess the efficacy of the cognitive reappraisal strategy on an angry mood
state, we will compare subjective ratings of negative affect after angry mood
inductions, in which participants reappraise their emotions (Angry Reappraise),
compared to ratings of angry mood inductions when participants do not attempt to
alter the emotional reactions (Angry Attend). We hypothesize that the Angry
Reappraise condition will result in less negative affect than the Angry attend trial.
3. To evaluate whether cognitive reappraisal has an impact on mood-based
interpretation bias, we will compare the endorsed choice of ambiguous sentences
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following ‘Anger Attend’ and ‘Anger Reappraise’ trials. We hypothesize that
individuals will choose the negatively valenced answer more often following the
‘Anger Attend’ trial than the ‘Anger Reappraise’ trial.
4. To understand whether state and trait mood features such as anxiety and anger, as
well as effective use of emotion regulation impacts the efficacy of laboratory
emotion regulation techniques, we will evaluate scores from self-report measures
to determine if participants differ in subjective ratings of emotion regulation
success and interpretation bias following laboratory procedures designed to
reduce negative emotionality following reappraisal of angry mood states.
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II. METHOD
	
  
A. Participants
Participants included 103 Marquette undergraduate students who were recruited
through the Marquette University’s Research Participant pool and received course credit
for their participation. The mean age of the sample was 19 years and ranged from 18 to
23 years. Sixty-three percent of the sample was white and 56% were female. All
participants met inclusion criteria for this study and denied being under the care of a
psychiatrist or a psychologist or used medication for the treatment of any Axis I mood
disorder. Experimental procedures were approved by Marquette’s Internal Review Board
and written informed consent was obtained from each participant prior to beginning the
experiment.
B. Materials
	
  
	
  
Mood Induction Each participant underwent an angry and a neutral mood
induction procedure (MIP). In the Anger MIP, participants were instructed to recall a
time in which they felt extremely angry, and when recalling the event they still feel
strong frustration, irritation, and / or anger. In the Neutral MIP, participants were
instructed to think about their morning daily routine (e.g. getting ready for school or
work). In each MIP, participants were instructed to write about this memory in the form
of a narrative and recall details about the event. Participants were given 5 minutes to
write about the event, but were able advance if they finished before the allotted time.
After writing each narrative, participants were asked to reflect and re-experience the
memory they recalled for 30 seconds. Several studies have found that the use of
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autobiographical recall is an effective technique to induce targeted emotions (Jallais &
Gilet, 2010; Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011)
C. Emotion Regulation Task
	
  
	
  
Training. To acquaint participants with the emotion regulation task, they were
first given an explanation of the difference between ‘Attend’ and ‘Reappraise’ trials.
Specifically, when the words ‘Attend’ appeared, participants were instructed to view the
photo and allow themselves to experience any emotions that surfaced without trying to
alter them. For the reappraise instruction, participants were told to re-interpret the content
of the picture to be less negative. When participants were instructed to Reappraise a
Neutral photograph, they were told that despite the neutral content of the stimulus, that it
was still possible to reinterpret the content to be less negative. Standardized pictures from
the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005) were
used during this phase so that stimuli and instructions were the same across participants.
Participants viewed 2 different sets of standardized pictures (1 Neutral/Attend, 1
Neutral/Reappraise, 1 Negative/Attend, and 1 Negative/Reappraise). The first set was
viewed with the experimenter (and instruction) and the other set was viewed alone, in
order to practice the strategies.
Experimental. In the experimental procedures, participants underwent the MIP
prior to emotion regulation instructions. Just as in training, when participants were shown
the ‘Attend’ prompt, they paid attention to the emotions that surfaced as a result of the
MIP. When participants were shown the ‘Reappraise’ prompt, they were asked to
reappraise their view of the story to decrease negative emotions. For example, if a
participant were to write about her/his mother being late to her/his high school
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graduation, s/he could reinterpret the feeling as gratitude that the mother took the time to
check on the final details of the graduation party to make it successful. In ‘Reappraisal’
trials, participants were instructed to write their reinterpretation of the Angry MIP. As in
the training phase, prior to and following both ‘Attend’ and ‘Reappraise’ prompts,
participants were asked to rate the degree of negative affect they were currently
experiencing on a Visual Analogue Scale.
Mood Booster Because of the counterbalanced nature of this design, we instituted
a mood booster to ensure that participants remained in a given mood state. In a
questionnaire that participants completed prior to the experimental tasks, participants
were asked to select and label two extremely anger-inducing events. For the Angry
condition, participants were instructed to think and write about the second pre-chosen
angry event. In the Neutral condition, participants were instructed to think about their
evening routing (e.g. brushing teeth, washing face, etc). Format of mood booster was
identical to the first MIP. Participants wrote about each event for a maximum of 5
minutes and then were instructed to think about each event for 30 seconds. The use of
multiple memories in the same targeted state has been proven effective in other studies
(Kross, Davidson, Weber, Ochsner, 2009).
Sentence Completion Task The experimental paradigm consisted of 30
sentences modified from existing sentence completion paradigms (Barton et al., 2005;
Beard & Amir, 2009; Bloom & Fischler, 1980; Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards &
Mathews, 1991; Huppert et al., 2007; Loevinger, 1985; Rotter, Rafferty, & Schachtitz,
1949). Additional sentences were created by lab members. Sentences were designed or
modified to illustrate ambiguous situations pertaining to threat, social settings, and
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optimism. All sentences in the existing paradigm were created or modified grammatically
to be in the first person. Sentences were presented with the last word missing, which is
the disambiguating part. Participants were asked to complete the last word using a forcedchoice response style, in which, they completed the sentence with the best word from a
set of 3 answer choices that were positive, negative, and neutral in valence.
Self-report measures Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire- Short Form
(MASQ; Clark & Watson, 1991). The MASQ is a 62-item questionnaire that assesses
mood and anxiety symptoms. We included this measure in place of the BAI and the BDI
to measure sub-clinical levels of anxiety and depression in order to understand how
common levels of anxiety and depression influence MIP and the resolution of ambiguity.
Participants were instructed to read through a list of feelings, sensations, and problems,
and asked to indicate the degree to which they experienced this in the last week on a 5point likert scale, 1 indicating ‘not at all’ and 5 indicating ‘extremely’. The MASQ score
is presented in 4 scales: General Distress: Anxiety, General Distress: Depression,
Anxious Arousal, and Anhedonic Depression). General Distress scales measure
nonspecific symptoms of anxiety and depression. Anxious Arousal measures
physiological symptoms of anxiety, while Anhedonic Depression examines general
negativity and activity level. The MASQ has shown good convergent validity across all
subscales (r>.71 for all scales) (Watson, 2005).
State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory-2 (STAXI-2; Spielberger, 1999) was used
to assess feelings of anger. The STAXI-2 is a 57-item measure that examines current
feelings of anger, as well as trait displays of anger involving temperament and mood
expression. Participants read statements and indicated the amount to which they currently
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or typically identify with each statement. The STAXI-2 examines inward vs. outward
expression (anger-in vs. anger-out) as well as verbal and physical expressions of anger.
Higher scores indicate a greater degree of feelings or expression of anger. This measure
has displayed high internal consistency (Spielberger, 1999).
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Romer, 2004). The
DERS is a 36-item measure that assesses dysfunction in emotion regulation. Participants
read a sentence and based on a likert scale and noted how much the statement applied to
them. High scores indicate a greater level of emotion dysregulation. In addition to a total
score of emotion dysregulation, the DERS has several subscales that target specific
aspects of emotion dysregulation (e.g. impulse control, lack of emotional awareness, etc).
The DERS has been shown to have high internal consistency (α=.93) and construct
validity as measured by statistically significant correlations between the DERS and
another measure of emotion regulation (Generalized Expectancy for Negative Mood
Regulation Scale) (Gratz & Romer, 2004). Measuring emotion dysregulation allowed us
to better assess participant’s ability to engage in assigned emotion regulation strategies.
The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire- Short Form (ERQ-SF); Egloff,
Schmuckle, Burns, & Schwerdtfeger, 2006) is a 6-item questionnaire used to assess the
utilization of Reappraisal and Suppression during a mood induction. The questionnaire is
comprised of a 3-item Reappraisal scale and a 3-item Suppression scale. The degree to
which participants engage in either emotion regulation strategy habitually is likely to
influence interpretation bias and explicit emotion regulation.
Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS-SR; Liebowitz, 1987). The LSAS-SR is a
24-item self-report measure that assesses fear and avoidance of several social situations.
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We measured social anxiety in addition to generalized anxiety in order to better
understand the influence of specific types of anxiety on the experimental paradigm.
Similar to generalized anxiety, individuals with social anxiety often possess a negativity
bias when resolving ambiguous information (Huppert et al., 2007). Participants were
asked to read statements and indicate the degree of fear or anxiety they experienced as
well as the degree of avoidant behavior they engaged in within the last week. Scores on
the fear scale and avoidant scale are summed together. Higher scores indicate a greater
level of social phobia. This measure has displayed good test-retest reliability (r=.083)
with a time interval of 12 weeks and a high level of internal consistency (α=.95) (Baker,
Heinrichs, Kim, & Hofmann, 2002).
Personality Inventory-Revised: (NEO PI-R; Costa & McCrae, 1992) was used to
assess personality characteristics. In particular, the assessment contains 60 items that
comprise 5 different domains: Neuroticism, Extroversion, Openness to Experience,
Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. Participants read statements and indicated the
degree to which they agree or disagree with each item. This survey has reported high
internal consistencies, ranging from .82 to .92 (Costa & McCrae, 1992). It is important to
assess personality characteristics in participants as it has been shown that personality
interacts with response modulation and interpretation of ambiguity (Stemmler & Wacker,
2010).
The Life Orientation Test Revised (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994) is
a 10-item questionnaire used to measure trait optimism. Participants read each statement
and indicated using a likert scale, the degree to which they agree or disagree with each
item. Three items are phrased in a positive way and 3 in a negative manner, while the
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remaining 4 items are used as fillers. Higher scores indicate greater levels of optimism.
Similar to depression, optimism and pessimism have been found to influence decisionmaking (Hey, Lotito, Maffioletti, 2010).
D. Procedure
	
  
	
  
Participants were asked to attend 1, 60-minute, experimental session at the
Inquiries in Affective Science Lab at Marquette University. All participants first read and
signed a consent form. The experimental procedures took place on a 22-inch computer in
the lab, using E-Prime (Version 2) software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.).
Participants who agreed to participate then completed a demographics survey, DERS,
MASQ, and STAXI, and LOT-R (See appendix for LOT-R results).
Participants then completed baseline emotion ratings, in which they were asked to
rate the extent that they were experiencing several emotions at the time of testing, using
an automated 10 cm Visual Analogue Scale (VAS: 0-10), from ‘not at all’ (0) to
‘extremely’ (10). Emotion descriptors were presented and rated separately, and included:
Aggressive, Angry, Annoyed, Anxious, Aroused, Cheerful, Excited, Happy, Nostalgic,
and Sad. Participants then completed a block of 6 items from the sentence completion
paradigm to assess the presence of any baseline interpretation biases.
Following baseline measures, the training phase took place and the experimenter
explained the emotion regulation instructions. Participants were taught to Attend and
Reappraise for both negative and neutral pictures. The experimenter left the room and the
participant viewed a second set of standardized photos in order to practice instructed
emotion regulation without the experimenter present. Before and after the negative and
neutral training trials, participants rated the degree of negative affect they were currently
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experiencing on a Visual Analogue Scale to ensure the efficacy of emotion regulation
procedures.
Following training, participants completed experimental procedures for both the
Angry and Neutral mood conditions, counterbalanced across participants. In both
conditions, participants completed MIPs, followed by a rating of emotion descriptors to
ensure that the MIP was effective. The emotion regulation task then began and consisted
of 2 phases: ‘Attend’ and ‘Reappraise’. Phase order was counterbalanced across
participants. To begin, participants first saw one emotion regulation instruction for 4
seconds (e.g. ‘Attend’ or ‘Reappraise’). Following this period, participants rated the
degree of negative affect they were experiencing on a scale of 1-10 (1= weak; 10=
strong) using the visual analogue scale. Participants then completed a block of 6 items
from the sentence completion paradigm.
Between emotion regulation instructions, participants completed the mood
booster in which they underwent a second MIP in the targeted state. Participants then saw
the second emotion regulation instruction. After writing and reflecting on this emotion,
participants rated the degree of negative affect they were experiencing. Following the
second emotion regulation (Attend or reappraise), participants then completed another
block of 6 items from the sentence completion paradigm. At the end of each trial,
participants viewed the word ‘RELAX’ for 5 seconds. At the end of each mood
condition, participants rated several emotion descriptors.
Each item of the sentence completion task began with a 2 second fixation point,
followed by a screen presenting the sentence for 6 seconds. The next screen showed all 3
answer choices: one with a positive valence, one with a neutral valence, and one with a
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negative valence. Participants were instructed to choose the response that best completed
the sentence. There were no time constraints on selecting a response. Once experimental
procedures were complete, participants completed another set of questionnaires that
included the two forms of the ERQ-SF to assess both Angry and Neutral MIPs, LSAS,
NEO (see appendix for LSAS and NEO results).
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III. RESULTS

	
  
	
  
A. Manipulation Check
	
  
	
  
To confirm the efficacy of each MIP, a series of repeated measures analysis of
variances (rmANOVAs) were performed to ensure that participants’ subjective ratings of
emotion descriptors were in the intended direction after each MIP. The emotion
descriptors were first divided into 3 groups: Positive (Amused, Excited, Happy, Joyful,
Peaceful), Negative (Angry, Annoyed, Anxious, Negative Affect, Sad), and Engagement
(Aroused, Interested). Three, Time x Emotion Descriptor rmANOVAs were conducted
for each mood induction. In addition, average time to complete the MIP was noted. All
statistical analyses were analyzed at an alpha level of .05 in SPSS 21.0 (SPSS, 2012).
In the Angry MIP, participants wrote for an average of 3.5 minutes. Results from
the Angry MIP, revealed significant main effects of time and emotion, qualified by a
significant interaction (Table 1: rmANOVA results). Specifically, ratings of Negative
emotions increased from pre- to post-Angry MIP, while Positive emotions decreased. The
interaction effect in both analyses is explained by specific descriptors changing at
different rates (see Figures 1 and 2). Finally, we examined Arousal separately using a
paired t-test and found that this rating did not significantly change, t(102)=-1.44, p=.15.
In essence, the Angry MIP was effective at increasing ratings of negative emotions, and
decreasing positive emotions and did not change arousal. Ratings of ‘Negative Affect’
were considered especially important, as participants rated this descriptor multiple times
throughout the experiment to track efficacy of mood boosters and emotion regulation in
place of the full set of emotion descriptors to reduce participant fatigue. As such, this
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descriptor was analyzed separately using a paired t-test and found that ratings of Negative
Affect significantly increased from pre- to post- Angry MIP, t(102)=-11.49, p<.001.
In the Neutral MIP, participants wrote for an average of 2.5 minutes. Identical
analyses were conducted to examine emotion descriptor changes from pre- to postNeutral MIP (Table 2: Results of rmANOVA analyzing change). Results from the
Negative emotion descriptors analysis found significant main effects of time and emotion
that was qualified by a significant interaction. Specifically, all negative descriptors,
except ‘Anxious’ decreased slightly, while Anxious ratings increased (See Figure 3). In a
separate analysis, ratings of Negative Affect significantly decreased from pre- to postMIP, t(101)=2.70, p<.01. In the positive emotion descriptor analysis, only a main effect
of emotion was observed, indicating that participants rated emotions differently, though
they did not significantly change (Figure 4). Finally, a paired t-test indicated that ratings
of Arousal did not significantly change, t(101)=-.70, p=.49. Results from these analyses
indicate that the Neutral MIP did not change positive emotions, however, negative
emotions mostly decreased, with the exception of anxiety. Comparing effect sizes,
emotion ratings in the Angry condition (partial η2=0.69), were much larger than in the
Neutral condition (partial η2=0.04), which is considered a small effect.
To examine efficacy of mood induction boosters that were utilized between
emotion regulation instructions, paired t-tests were conducted to examine ratings of
negative affect following mood induction and mood booster. In the Angry condition,
there was no significant difference between these ratings of Negative Affect, indicating
that the Angry mood booster was effective at producing similar levels of negative affect
as the initial mood induction: t(102), p=0.24. A second paired t-test was performed to
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compare ratings of Negative Affect for the Neutral mood induction and the Neutral mood
booster. The results indicate that participants rated significantly less negative affect in the
Neutral mood booster compared to the Neutral mood induction: t(101), p<0.001.
B. Mood Induction and Interpretation Bias (Aim 1)
	
  
	
  
The first aim was to determine whether mood had an effect on interpretation bias.
We conducted a 3x3 rmANOVA of mood (baseline, neutral, negative) and response
valence (Positive, Negative, and Neutral). (Table 5: Means and standard deviations of the
number of Positive, Negative and Neutral endorsements Table 3: rmANOVA analysis).
In these analyses, the statistic of interest was the interaction as it illustrates the proportion
of endorsed response valences by condition. Any main effect of mood would be
uninterruptible as each mood had the same number of sentences. Results revealed a
significant main effect of Response Valence, F(2,94)=69.64, partial η2=0.60, p<.001,
with a moderate effect size. This main effect was qualified by a statistically significant
interaction effect for Mood and Response Valence, F(4,92)=7.59, partial η2=0.25,
p<0.001, which is indicative of a medium effect size (Figure 5). To better understand this
interaction effect, 3 1(Mood) x 3 (Response Valence) rmANOVAs were conducted.
Specifically, a 1(Baseline) x 3(positive, negative, neutral responses) was conducted.
Results indicated a significantly different number of responses endorsed at Baseline,
F(2,94)=70.34, partial η2=0.60, p<0.001. Post hoc Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni
correction revealed that participants endorsed significantly fewer Negative responses than
Positive (Mean Difference=-1.69, p<0.001, Negative mean=0.90, Positive mean=2.58) or
Neutral responses (Mean Difference=-1.65, p<0.001, Negative mean=0.90 Neutral
mean=2.54). There was no significant difference between the numbers of Positive or
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Neutral endorsed responses. These results indicate that at Baseline, participants exhibit a
tendency to interpret ambiguous stimuli as positive or neutral.
To examine interpretation bias in the Neutral condition a 1(Neutral) x 3(Response
Valence) rmANOVA was conducted. Results indicated that participants endorsed
significantly different number of response valences in the Neutral condition,
F(2,100)=34.41, partial η2=0.41, p<0.001, with a medium effect size. Post hoc Pairwise
comparisons using Bonferroni correction revealed that participants endorsed fewer
Negative responses than Positive responses (Mean Difference=-0.76, p<0.01, Negative
mean=1.20, Positive mean=1.95) or Neutral responses (Mean Difference=-1.66 p<0.001,
Negative mean=1.20, Neutral mean=2.85). Additionally, participants endorsed more
Neutral responses than Positive responses (Mean Difference=0.90, p<0.01, Positive
mean=1.95, Neutral mean=2.85). As such, in the Neutral condition, participants were
more likely to exhibit a Neutral bias.
Finally, to examine interpretation bias in the Angry condition a 1(Angry) x
3(Response Valence) rmANOVA was conducted. Results indicated that participants in
the Angry condition endorsed significantly different number of valenced responses,
F(2,101)=13.40, partial η2=0.21, p<0.001. Post hoc Pairwise comparisons using
Bonferroni correction revealed that participants endorsed significantly fewer Negative
responses compared to Positive responses (Mean Difference=-0.80, p<0.01, Negative
mean=1.40, Positive mean=2.19) or Neutral responses (Mean Difference=-1.01, p<0.001,
Negative mean=1.40, Neutral mean=2.41). There was no significant difference between
the number of Positive and Neutral endorsements in the Angry condition.
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Results from the Angry condition indicate that participants are likely to exhibit a
positive or neutral bias in interpreting ambiguous stimuli. However, looking at the means,
it is evident that there were more negative responses endorsed in the Angry condition
compared to Neutral and Baseline. To explore this statistically, a 1 (Negative responses)
x 3 (Mood) rmANOVA was conducted and revealed that significantly different number
of negative responses were endorsed in each condition F(2,94)=6.07, partial η2=0.11,
p<0.01. Post hoc pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni correction revealed that
participants in the Angry condition endorsed more Negative responses compared to
Baseline (Mean Difference=.47, p<.01, Baseline mean=.90, Angry mean=1.37), but not
Neutral (Mean Difference=-.17, p=n.s. Neutral mean=1.2). In essence, while participants
in the Angry condition are more likely to endorse positive or neutral responses to
ambiguity, rates of negative endorsements also significantly increase, compared to
Baseline.
C. Negative Affect and Emotion Regulation (Aim 2)
	
  
	
  
To examine ratings of negative affect and emotion regulation strategy, a 2 (Mood
Induction) x 2 (Emotion Regulation Strategy) was conducted (Table 7: Means and
standard deviations of each variable Table 4: rmANOVA analysis). The Mood Induction
variable had 2 levels: Angry and Neutral; and the Emotion Regulation variable had 2
levels: Attend and Reappraise. Results revealed significant main effects of Mood
Induction and Emotion Regulation Strategies, which were qualified by a significant
interaction between these variables. The significant interaction effect of Mood Induction
and Emotion Regulation revealed that negative affect for Reappraise was significantly
lower than Attend, for the Angry condition only, F(1, 101)=8.98, p<0.01, partial η2=0.08
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(Figure 2), with a small effect size. Follow-up paired t-tests confirmed this difference in
negative affect ratings between Attend and Reappraise in the Angry condition,
t(102)=5.76, p<0.001. The significant main effect of Mood Induction showed that
participants rated higher levels of Negative Affect in the Angry condition, compared to
the Neutral condition: F(1, 101)= 122.09, p<0.001, partial η2=0.55. The significant main
effect of Emotion Regulation showed that participants rated less negative affect after the
‘Reappraise’ instruction, compared to ‘Attend’: F(1, 101)=31.57, p<0.001, partial
η2=0.24. Overall, results from these analyses revealed that Reappraise was effective at
reducing Negative Affect ratings in the Angry condition, but not the Neutral condition.
D. Interpretation Bias and Emotion Regulation (Aim 3)
	
  
	
  
To assess whether interpretation bias can be modified by emotion regulation
strategies, separate 2(Emotion Regulation) x 3(Response Valence) rmANOVA were
conducted. Emotion Regulation had 2 levels: Attend and Reappraise, and Response
Valence had 3 levels: positive, negative, and neutral endorsed valences. As before, the
main focus is on the interaction effect. In the Angry condition, results revealed a
significant main effect of Response Valence, F(2,101)=29.09, partial η2=0.37, p<.001,
with a medium effect size (see Table 9: Means and standard deviations of each variable
Table 5: rmANOVA analysis). Pairwise comparison post hoc tests with Bonferroni
correction revealed that participants endorsed significantly fewer Negative responses than
Positive (Mean Difference=-.78, p<.001, Negative mean=1.37, Positive mean=2.16) or
Neutral (Mean Difference=-1.11, p<.001, Neutral mean=2.49) responses. There was no
significant difference between the numbers of Positive and Neutral endorsed responses
(Mean Difference=-.33, p=n.s.) (See Figure 7). A follow-up paired samples t-test was
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conducted to examine possible changes in the amount of Negative endorsements. Results
revealed that Emotion Regulation did not significantly impact the amount of Negative
endorsements, t(102)=.34, p=n.s. There was no significant main effect of Emotion
Regulation or a significant interaction effect. Results indicate that Angry participants
revealed a Positive/Neutral bias and that Emotion Regulation does not significantly
impact this.
Results from the rmANOVA conducted for the Neutral condition revealed a
significant main effect of response valence, F(2,100)=58.68, partial η2=.54, p<.001 with a
medium effect size (see Table 11: Means and standard deviations of each variable Table
6: rmANOVA analysis). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction
revealed that the number of endorsements of each valence were significantly different
from each other (see Figure 8), such that there were more Neutral responses than Positive
(Mean Difference=.84, p<.001, Neutral mean=2.84, Positive mean=2.00) or Negative
responses (Mean Difference=1.67, p<.001, Neutral mean=2.84, Negative mean=1.17).
Additionally, there were fewer Negative responses than Positive (Mean Difference=-.83,
p<.01). A follow-up paired t-test was conducted to examine Negative responses after
Emotion Regulation strategies. Results revealed that there was no significant difference
in Negative endorsements between Attend and Reappraise, t(101)=.43, p=n.s.. No
significant main effect of Emotion Regulation or interaction effect was observed. Thus,
results from this study indicate that participants in the Neutral condition exhibited a
Neutrality bias and emotion regulation strategies did not significantly influence this.
Taken together, results from the Angry and Neutral analyses indicated that
Emotion Regulation does not significantly impact valenced response endorsement in
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either the Angry or Neutral condition. Further, results restate Aim 1 findings that Angry
participants exhibit a Positive/Neutral bias, where as Neutral participants show a
Neutrality bias.
E. Self-report measures and Reappraising Angry Events: Predicting Negative Affect
and Interpretation Bias (Aim 4)
	
  
	
  
To understand how information gathered from self-report measures, such as trait
anxiety, depression, anger, and trait emotion regulation, impact the utilization and
success of cognitive reappraisal, a series of regression analyses were conducted using
scores from self report measures to predict Negative Affect and number of endorsed
response valences following Reappraise trials from the Angry condition. (Note: To look
at regression analyses examining the LOT-R, NEO, and LSAS, see the Appendix.)
DERS
The first set of analyses examined the total score from the DERS which measures
difficulties in emotion regulation. Separate bivariate regression analyses were conducted
using the DERS total score as the independent variable to predict Negative Affect,
Positive responses, Negative responses, and Neutral responses following Reappraisal of
an angry autobiographical event. Results from the regression analysis predicting Negative
Affect indicated that the DERS score significantly predicted negative affect following
Reappraisal of an Angry event R2=0.08, F(1,100)=8.49, p<.001 with a modest effect size
(R=.28) and that the DERS predicts 8% of the variance in negative affect ratings
following Angry Reappraisal (See Table 7a for details). Additionally, the Constant
(B=2.28) revealed that if the DERS score was 0, participants would rate negative affect
after reappraisal as 2.28. Finally, the standardized beta (ß=.28, p<.001) indicated that
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with one standard deviation increase in DERS scores, negative affect following Angry
Reappraise would increase by almost one third of a standard deviation, indicating that
with greater difficulties in emotion regulation, negative affect also increases.
Using the same independent variable of DERS scores to predict the number of
Negative responses following Angry Reappraise revealed that the total DERS score
significantly predicted the dependent variable, F(1,100)=9.15, p<.01, with a small effect
size (R=.29). The DERS score predicted 8.4% of the variance in Negative responses
following Angry Reappraise (See Table 7c for details). The standardized beta (ß=.29,
p<.001) revealed that in the case that the DERS score increased by one standard
deviation, negative responses would also increase by almost one third of a standard
deviation, such that with greater difficulties in emotion regulation, the number of
negative responses following Angry Reappraise also increases.
Using the same independent variable of DERS scores to predict the number of
positive responses following Angry reappraise indicated that the DERS score
significantly predicted Positive responses F(1, 100)=7.64, p<.01), though the effect size
was small (R=.27), with the DERS scale predicting 7% of the variance in Positive
responses following Angry Reappraise (See Table 7b for details). The standardized beta
(ß=-.27, p<.001) indicated that with one standard deviation increase in DERS scores, the
number of positive responses would decrease by over one fourth of a standard deviation,
thus with more difficulties endorsed on the DERS, the number of positive responses
decreases.
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Finally, the regression analysis to predict the number of Neutral responses
following Angry Reappraise indicated that the DERS scale did not significantly predict
the dependent variable, F(1,100)=0.00, p=n.s. (See Table 7d for details).
STAXI
The second set of analyses utilized multiple regression to predict Negative Affect
and the number of Negative, Positive, and Neutral endorsed responses following Angry
Reappraise from the STAXI-II, which is used to measure state and trait anger. The first
multiple regression model predicted Negative Affect ratings following Angry Reappraise
from the independent variables of state and trait anger. This analysis revealed that state
and trait anger did not significantly predict negative affect following Angry Reappraise,
F(2,99)=2.11, p=n.s. (See Table 8a for details of the analysis). Despite the nonsignificant model, the independent variable of state anger significantly predicted negative
affect (ß=.21, p<.05), indicating more state anger predicts greater levels of Negative
Affect following Angry Reappraise.
The second multiple regression analysis used the same independent variables to
predict the number of positive responses. Results indicated that state and trait anger did
not significantly predict the number of positive responses F(2,99)=1.88, p=n.s. (See
Table 8b for details). The third multiple regression analysis predicted negative responses
from state and trait anger. Results revealed that state and trait anger significantly predict
the number of Negative responses F(2,99)=5.09, p<.01 with a medium effect size
(R=.31), where state and trait anger ratings predicted 9.3% of the variance in Negative
responses (See Table 8c). Examining individual predictors revealed that state anger alone
significantly predicted the number of negative responses endorsed following Angry
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Reappraise (ß=.23, p<.05), such that one standard deviation increase in State Anger
ratings, would increase the number of negative responses by almost one quarter of a
standard deviation.
The final multiple regression analysis predicted the number of Neutral endorsed
responses following Angry Reappraise. Results revealed that state and trait scores from
the STAXI-II did not significantly predict the number of Neutral responses following
Angry Reappraise, F(2,99)=0.02, p=n.s. (See Table 8d for details).
MASQ
A third set of multiple regression analyses were conducted to predict Negative
Affect and the number of Negative, Positive, and Neutral response valences following
Angry Reappraise, using anxiety and depression scales from the MASQ. The first
regression analysis predicted Negative Affect Following Angry Reappraise from the
MASQ subscales. Results indicated that reported General Anxiety, General Depression,
Anxious Arousal, and Anhedonic Depression did not significantly predict the dependent
variable F(4,97)=1.48, p=n.s. (See Table 9a).
A second regression analysis used the same 4 independent variables to predict the
number of positive responses following Angry Reappraise. Results revealed that General
Anxiety, General Depression, Anxious Arousal, and Anhedonic Depression significantly
predicted the number of positive responses following Angry Reappraise, F(4,97)=3.67,
p<.01 with a medium effect size (R=3.6), where the MASQ subscales predicted 13% of
the variance in the number of positive responses following Angry Reappraise (See Table
9b for details). Examining individual predictors revealed that reports of Anhedonic
Depression significantly predicted the number of positive responses following Angry
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Reappraise (ß=-.33, p<.01), such that with a one standard deviation increase in
Anhedonic Depression, the number of positive responses following Angry Reappraise
decreased by one third of a standard deviation.
A separate multiple regression analysis was conducted to predict the number of
Negative responses following Angry Reappraise from the same 4 subscales. Results
revealed that General Anxiety, General Depression, Anxious Arousal, and Anhedonia
scales significantly predicted the number of Negative responses endorsed following
Angry Reappraise, F(4,97)=4.78, p=.001 with a medium effect (R=.41), such that MASQ
scales predicted 17% of the variance in the number of Negative responses endorsed
following Angry Reappraise (See Table 9c for details). Examination of individual
predictors revealed that Anxious Arousal significantly predicted the number of Negative
responses following Angry Reappraise (ß=-.29, p<.05), where one standard deviation
increase in Anxious Arousal will result in almost one third of a standard deviation
decrease in Negative endorsements following Angry Reappraise.
Multiple regression was also used to predict the number of endorsed Neutral
responses following Angry Reappraise, using the MASQ scales as independent variables.
Results indicated that these scales did not significantly predict the number of Neutral
endorsed responses following Angry Reappraise, F(4,97)=1.15, p=n.s. (See Table 9d for
details).
ERQ-SF
A final set of multiple regression analyses were conducted to predict Negative
Affect and the number of valenced responses following Angry Reappraise as the
dependent variables, and the degree to which participants engaged in Reappraise and
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Suppression during the Angry mood induction, measured by the ERQ-SF, as the
independent variables. The first multiple regression analysis predicted Negative Affect
following Angry Reappraise from Reappraise and Suppression scales from the ERQ-SF.
Results revealed that engagement in Reappraise and Suppression did not significantly
predict Negative Affect following Angry Reappraise, F(2,98)=2.08, p=n.s. (See Table
10a for details of the analysis).
Engagement of Reappraisal and Suppression during the Angry mood induction
was also used to predict the number of Positive responses endorsed following Angry
Reappraise. Results revealed that the independent variables significantly predicted the
number of positive endorsements following Angry Reappraise, F(2,98)=4.68, p<.05, with
a medium effect size (R=.30), such that Reappraisal and Suppression explained 8.7% of
the variance in the number of positive responses (See Table 10b for details). Examining
individual predictors, revealed that using Reappraisal during the Angry mood induction
significantly predicted the number of positive responses (ß=.30, p<.01), such that one
standard deviation increase in Reappraisal raises the number of positive endorsements by
almost one third of a standard deviation.
Multiple regression analysis, predicting the number of Negative endorsements
from Reappraise and Suppression scales from the ERQ-SF, revealed that the independent
variables significantly predicted the dependent variable, F(2,98)=8.43, p<.001 with a
medium effect size (R=.38), where these scales predicted 14.7% of the variance in
Negative endorsements following Angry Reappraise (See Table 10c for details).
Examining individual predictors revealed that engagement in Reappraisal during the
Angry mood induction significantly predicted negative responses (ß=-.38, p<.001), such
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that where Reappraisal increases by one standard deviation, the number of Negative
endorsements following Angry Reappraise decreases by almost two fifths of a standard
deviation.
Finally, engagement in Reappraisal and Suppression in the Angry mood induction
was used to predict the number of Neutral responses following Angry Reappraise.
Results revealed that the independent variables did not significantly predict the dependent
variable, F(2,98)=.25, p=n.s. (See Table 10d for details of the analysis), indicating that
engagement in suppression and reappraisal during the MIP does not predict Neutral
responses after Angry reappraisal.
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IV. DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study was to understand the role of cognitive reappraisal on

explicit (self-report of negative affect) and implicit (interpretation bias) biases. Results
showed that autobiographical recall was an effective technique to induce Angry and
Neutral mood states. Cognitive reappraisal was effective at reducing explicit feelings of
negative affect after autobiographical recall of an angry event. The implicit interpretation
bias in the Angry and Neutral mood states showed that participants exhibited an equally
positive and neutral bias to ambiguous information in both mood states, however, the
Angry condition showed an increased negativity bias compared to baseline. Utilization of
cognitive reappraisal did not significantly change interpretation bias in either the Angry
or Neutral mood state. Finally, significant relationships were observed between state and
trait dimensions of emotion and utilization of emotion regulation techniques, and
interpretation bias. Specific findings and implications of each aim are discussed below.
A. Explicit Bias and Mood State
	
  
	
  
Examining explicit bias (i.e. negative affect ratings) showed that subjective
ratings of negativity were higher in the Angry condition than the Neutral condition.
Further, instructed Reappraisal, but not Attending to emotions, was effective at reducing
subjective feelings of negativity in the Angry condition. Cognitive reappraisal has been
shown to be effective at reducing general negative emotionality (Denson, Moulds, &
Grisham, 2012; Mauss, Cook, Cheng, & Gross, 2007; Ray, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2008;
Szasz, Szentagotai, & Hofmann, 2011). Specifically regarding Anger, cognitive
reappraisal is effective at reducing negativity in a variety of Angry MIPs including
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autobiographical recall (Denson, Moulds, & Grisham, 2012; Ray, Wilhelm, & Gross,
2008), guided imagery (Szasz, Szentagotai, & Hofmann, 2011) and anger provocations
(Mauss, Cook, Cheng, & Gross, 2007).
Cognitive reappraisal was also implemented in the Neutral condition. Results
indicated that while ratings of negative affect between Attend and Reappraise in the
Neutral condition did not reach statistical significance, there was a trend for individuals
to rate less negative affect following the Reappraise than Attend in the Neutral condition
(p=0.07). Few studies have instructed participants to implement this strategy to Neutral
stimuli. In fact, only two studies were found that included a similar condition (Golkar et
al. 2012; Ray, McRae, Ochsner, & Gross, 2010. Ray et al. (2010) measured emotion
regulation success using ratings of negative affect (as in the current study), while Golkar
et al. (2012) measured subjective ratings of discomfort. Both studies found that
reappraising both neutral and negative stimuli significantly decreased the dependent
variable (Negative Affect or Discomfort) compared to Attend trials. Therefore, Neutral
Reappraise results from the current study slightly differ from the current literature. One
consideration that may account for this difference is that both aforementioned studies
used picture stimuli to induce targeted moods, while the current study used
autobiographical recall. It is plausible that when there is limited emotionality to the
stimuli (i.e. Neutral), participants may find it easier to reappraise concrete stimuli, such
as pictures, compared to more nebulous stimuli, such as autobiographical recall. Another
confounding factor that precludes direct comparison with the current study is that when
using standardized stimuli, researchers have normative measures of valence and arousal,
which is absent in personalized stimuli. Thus the current stimuli may have differed on
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either axis (valence or arousal) from the standardized stimuli that may explain the
difference in subjective changes in negative affect to neutral stimuli.
B. Mood and Interpretation Bias
	
  
	
  
Results from interpretation bias analyses indicated that at Baseline, participants
endorsed mainly positive and neutral responses, indicating a positive/neutrality bias and
an absence of negativity bias. Compared to Baseline, participants in the Neutral condition
endorsed more neutral responses and fewer positive responses, indicating a neutrality
bias. Finally, participants in the Angry condition mainly endorsed positive and neutral
responses, similar to the Baseline condition. However, they also endorsed a greater
number of negative responses relative to Baseline, indicating an increased negativity bias
in the Angry condition. Results from this study are consistent with previous research. For
example, Wenzel and Lystad (2005) found that angry participants displayed a negative
interpretation bias in estimating the likelihood that negative events would occur. This
study also included anxious participants and found that both conditions displayed a
negative interpretation bias, though it was more pronounced in the Angry condition.
Participants in this study were recruited based on trait anxiety and anger, while the
current study induced targeted mood states. Despite this difference in sample, both state
angry participants from the current study and trait angry participants from Wenzel and
Lystad (2005) displayed an increased negativity bias. Similarly, Barrazzone & Davey
(2009) found that when participants in angry mood states were presented with
homographs that had a neutral or threat resolution and found that angry participants were
more likely to endorse the threat resolution. Results from the current study indicate that
Anger primes participants to interpret ambiguity in an increasingly negative manner,
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while the literature indicates that anger leads individuals to display an overtly negative
interpretation bias. This difference between the literature and the current study may be a
result of the experimental interpretation bias paradigm (see Limitations for details).
Nevertheless, a conservative interpretation of the evidence is that Anger increases the
likelihood that participants interpret ambiguity negatively.
Conversely, several studies from the risk literature found that angry participants
were more likely to make optimistic judgments about risk (Lerner & Keltner, 2000;
Lerner & Keltner, 2001). The idea that angry participants are likely to display optimism
in risk perceptions seems contrary to findings in the current study. In fact, the appraisal
tendency theory (Lerner & Kelnter, 2000) helps explain this difference. Specifically, this
theory posits that emotions trigger changes in cognitions that influence judgments and
decision-making that are based on levels of certainty. For example, the authors posit that
anger is an emotion that is associated with assertiveness that in turn influences feelings of
certainty in control. The appraisal-tendency theory then posits that angry individuals,
who tend to be more assertive, will feel they have control over uncertain events, which
then influences perceptions of risk to be less threatening. This theory was corroborated
using a series of studies that employed both trait anger and induced anger (Lerner &
Kelnter, 2001). Despite the confidence of angry decision makers, there is no evidence
that these decisions are advantageous. Research has shown that angry individuals process
information at a shallow level, employing shortcuts, such as stereotyping and reliance on
superficial cues to make judgments that influence decision making. This was in contrast
to sad participants who used more complex heuristics in making judgments
(Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994). Reliance on superficial cues to make
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decisions puts angry decision makers at risk for making uninformed and potentially less
advantageous decisions, despite feeling confident in their optimistic perceptions of risk.
Taken together, angry individuals display a negative interpretation bias to stimuli
that examine general optimism in future events (predicting the likelihood of a negative
event occurring), threat (homographs) and decision-making in situations that pertain to
general optimism, social settings, and threat (the current paradigm). However, anger is
also associated with an optimistic view toward risk assessment, though this may be due to
increased assertiveness and impulsivity. Therefore, optimistic risk assessments may not
translate to optimism in other areas that imply positive affect. As such, we can conclude
that Anger increases the likelihood that individuals will display a negative interpretation
bias.
C. Emotion Regulation and Interpretation Bias
	
  
	
  
In the current study, interpretation bias did not change with instructed emotion
regulation strategies. In the Angry condition, participants endorsed mainly positive and
neutral responses with fewer negative responses in both Attend and Reappraise trials. In
the Neutral condition, participants endorsed mostly neutral responses, followed by
positive responses. Participants endorsed significantly less negative responses than
positive or neutral. Similar to the Angry condition, this pattern held for both Attend and
Reappraise trials in the Neutral condition. Contrary to the hypothesis, evidence from both
mood conditions indicated that emotion regulation did not significantly change the
interpretation of ambiguous information. Few studies have examined the relationship of
changing interpretation biases through emotion regulation; however, other studies have
experimentally modified the interpretation bias to understand the resulting behavioral
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changes (Beard & Amir, 2008; Koster, Fox, & MacLeod, 2009; Wilson, MacLeod,
Mathews, & Rutherford, 2006). For example, MacLeod et al. (2006) experimentally
induced a threatening or nonthreatening interpretation bias. Threat bias was induced by
continually encouraging participants to access threat meanings to homographs through
numerous trials, and filling in missing letters to threat homographs. Feedback was given
at each trial to encourage the generation of threat interpretations. Participants who
underwent the threat interpretation training exhibited a significantly higher level of state
anxiety following the video stressor than those who did not. Results indicate that
experimentally modifying interpretation bias can increase emotional reaction in the
targeted valence, suggesting a potentially causal role for interpretation bias and
subsequent emotional reactions. Results from the current study found that interpretation
bias was not informative in understanding the cognitive impact of emotion regulation as
it was in MacLeod et al. (2006). However, given that the current results show that Angry
participants exhibited an increased negativity bias, it may be that this bias maintained the
generation of further negative resolutions. Thus, perhaps the increased negativity bias
may have been less amenable to change.
Another study examined interpretation bias as a means to reduce distress.
Specifically, Mathews, Ridgeway, Cook, and Yiend (2007), induced a positive
interpretation bias in trait anxious individuals. Training was completed over 4 sessions in
a graded fashion, such that the degree of positivity in the stimuli increased throughout the
sessions. Interpretation bias was induced by presenting participants with a description of
a situation and then presenting forced-choice questions where the positive resolution was
the only response that semantically fit. At the end of training, participants were able to
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access positive resolutions to ambiguous situations without assistance. Further, scores of
trait anxiety decreased from pre to post training. Results suggest that inducing a positive
interpretation bias may be helpful in treating emotional disorders, such as anxiety.
Together, these studies show that altering interpretation bias is effective at
changing mood and behavior. The aim of the current study was to see if instructed
cognitive reappraisal was a powerful enough tool to alter interpretation bias. Results
showed that this strategy was effective in managing negative emotionality, but not in
changing behavior. One explanation is that the aforementioned studies used more
cognitive-based tasks (filling in the missing letters of words, etc) that directly focused on
the interpretation bias. Further, participants in the described studies underwent intensive
training procedures that likely resulted in an automatic response style to the desired
effect. The current procedures utilized a training phase, though as it was more
emotionally based, it was less structured and incorporated fewer trials. This may partially
explain the different results in interpretation bias. However, it is unclear if altering
interpretation bias has longer lasting cognitive results compared to cognitive reappraisal.
As such, it appears that interpretation bias can help explain thoughts and behaviors,
though the utility of this strategy clinically warrants further research.
D. State and Trait Emotion, Cognitive Reappraisal, and Interpretation Bias
	
  
	
  
Information from self-report data gave us more insight into how participants
responded to both the emotion regulation task as well as interpretation bias. As the
primary interests in this study were anger, cognitive reappraisal, and interpretation bias,
we performed analyses that targeted this information. Namely, self-report data was used
to predict negative affect and responses from the sentence completion task after Angry
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Reappraisal. We found that individuals who endorsed greater emotion dysregulation on
the DERS, rated higher levels of negative affect following Angry Reappraise. This
indicates that individuals who endorsed greater emotion dysregulation in general, did not
experience the same benefits from instructed emotion regulation (as evidenced by
subjective ratings of negativity). This finding conceptually makes sense and fits with the
research that states that individuals who generally experience emotion dysregulation also
experience more negative emotions, including anger, and display greater physiological
responses to anger provocations, compared to individuals who regularly engage in
healthy emotion regulation (Mauss, Cook, Cheng, & Gross, 2007). Therefore, individuals
who are emotionally dysregulated may require more extensive training to benefit from
emotion regulation.
Further, in the current study, individuals who reported more emotion
dysregulation were also found to have an increased negativity bias and a decreased
positivity bias following Angry Reappraisal. This is consistent with a previous study that
examined the way implicit evaluation of emotion regulation paralleled the emotional
experience of anger (Mauss, Evers, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2006). This study used a
derivation of the Implicit Association Task (IAT) to measure implicit evaluation of
engagement in emotion regulation. Results indicated that those who valued emotion
regulation experienced less anger and fewer negative thoughts following an anger
provocation. The current results suggest that individuals who display emotion
dysregulation will not experience the benefits of cognitive reappraisal, as corroborated by
negative affect ratings. As such, it is unclear if instructed regulation was not as successful
due to baseline dysregulation of emotion, or less value placed in emotion regulation.
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Understanding anger was a central component to this study. Anger has been
associated with a particularly pronounced negative interpretation bias, recurrent negative
thinking, and other unique cognitions (Wenzel & Lystad, 2005; Wilkowski & Robinson,
2008). Therefore, understanding the influence of state and trait anger on the current
paradigm was of central importance. Results showed that individuals who endorsed
higher levels of anger, and especially state anger reported more negative affect following
Angry Reappraisal. Research shows that individuals who report high levels of anger, tend
to regularly engage in negative emotion regulation strategies such as rumination and
catastrophizing (Martin & Dahlen, 2005), indicating that they have more practice and
automatic cognitions related to these harmful strategies. Therefore, as cognitive
reappraisal differs greatly from these strategies, instructed reappraisal may be more
difficult and require more practice in order for the strategy to be used effectively.
Similarly, individuals who reported greater levels of anger, and once again
particularly state anger, displayed greater negativity biases. As indicated by analyses of
negative affect, it appears that such individuals did not benefit from cognitive reappraisal.
Taken together, individuals who reported greater levels of state anger reported more
negative affect and greater negativity biases following cognitive reappraisal of an angry
event. It is plausible that these individuals did not fully engage in reappraisal, as these
results are similar to what would be expected in unregulated anger. Interestingly,
significant results from this analysis revealed that state anger as compared to trait anger,
drove these results. Given the nature of this sample, it is plausible the majority of
participants do not experience pathological levels of trait anger, and therefore state anger
was more influential in this result.
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The current paradigm assessed instructed utilization of cognitive reappraisal.
However, it has been shown that some individuals automatically regulate their emotions
in a plethora of situations (Mauss, Bunge, & Gross, 2007), which likely impacts mood
induction techniques and instructed reappraisal. To understand the usage of emotion
regulation techniques during the mood induction, the ERQ-SF was administered. Results
indicated that individuals who endorsed engaging in reappraisal during the MIP,
displayed an increased positivity bias and less of a negativity bias. Results indicate that
when individuals reappraise while experiencing a negative emotion, interpretation biases
change to be more positive. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the
utilization of effective emotion regulation techniques during the emotional experience
reduces feelings of negativity. This likely speaks to implicit and habitual use of emotion
regulation. Several studies have indicated that implicit value and habitual use of emotion
regulation show different emotion profiles compared to individuals who do not regularly
engage in healthy emotion regulation strategies (Mauss, Evers, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2006;
Memedovic, Grisham, Denson, & Moulds, 2010). Such evidence may speak to implicit
emotion regulation facilitating effective explicit emotion regulation, which may then lead
to the expression of interpretation bias. There is growing evidence that explicit emotion
regulation is a cognitively demanding process that is demanding of executive control and
working memory capacities (McRae, Jacobs, Ray, John, & Gross, 2012). As such, it is
probable that individuals who greater benefitted from instructed cognitive reappraisal in
the current study are individuals who do not find the process as taxing and perhaps are
more likely to engage in automatic emotion regulation.
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Clinical anxiety and depression have demonstrated threat interpretation bias
(Richards, Reynolds, & French, 1992) and depressive interpretation biases (Dunn et al.,
2009) respectively. Assessing levels of anxiety and depression are important in this study
in order to understand the efficacy of instructed emotion regulation in such individuals as
it is directly applicable to clinical experiences. Results from analyses investigating
depression and anxiety symptoms indicated that individuals who rated higher levels of
anxiety and depression, in particular anhedonic symptoms (as measured by the MASQ)
reported a reduced positivity bias. There is some evidence in the literature suggesting that
in place of looking at overt interpretation bias, examining the reduction of positivity bias
aids in identifying depressive symptoms (Dunn, Stefanovitch, Buchan, Lawrence, &
Dalgleish, 2009). In particular, Dunn et al. (2009) used a working memory task without
feedback and examined self-judgments. Results indicated that a reduced positivity bias in
this task was associated with anhedonic symptoms. These data can be extended to the
current study in that anhedonic symptoms uniquely predicted a reduced positivity bias to
an ambiguous stimulus.
Conversely, individuals who endorsed higher levels of anxiety and depression,
and especially anxious arousal, reported a decreased negativity bias. This finding was
surprising, as negative interpretation biases tend to be prominent in anxiety disorders
(Franklin et al., 2005; Huppert et al., 2007; Wilson, et al., 2006). There were 2 measures
of anxiety in this model: anxious arousal and general anxious distress. That general
anxious distress did not contribute to this finding, it appears that the physiological arousal
component explains this result. Nes, Segerstrom, and Sephton, (2005) found that some
forms of positive emotions, such as optimism are associated with greater skin
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conductance responses and increased Cortisol. Therefore, trait factors such as optimism
that lead to a decreased negativity bias, may be physiologically taxing and mirroring
symptoms of anxious arousal (e. g. sweaty palms, racing, heart, etc).
There are several strengths that should be noted in this study. First, we used a
forced-choice paradigm, in which participants were instructed to select one of three
differently valenced responses. Several studies utilize a free-choice paradigm (Huppert et
al., 2007, Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010). This has some intuitive appeal in assessing
interpretation bias in that we can understand more precisely how responses are generated,
however the process of generating responses requires cognitive effort and may be less
susceptible to picking up interpretation biases. Also, participants may generate uncodable
responses. Second, the use of the current paradigm included the option to resolve the
ambiguity using positive, negative, and neutral valenced responses. Other studies include
only 2 valenced responses, such as threat and benign resolutions (Beard & Amir, 2009) or
negative and benign resolutions (Hindash & Amir, 2011). Using positive, negative, and
neutral resolutions allow us to understand the full spectrum of interpretation bias in
certain mood states.
Another strength of this study is that there is limited empirical data that speaks to
interpretation bias and emotion regulation in a nonclinical population. It has been shown
that interpretation bias plays a role in maintaining psychological distress in nonclinical
(Wilson et al., 2006) and clinical population (Franklin et al., 2005). It is also know that
cognitive reappraisal has been shown to be effective to decrease explicit distress
(Denson, Moulds, & Grisham, 2012; Fabiansson, Denson, Moulds, Grisham, & Schira,
2012; Mauss, Cook, Cheng, & Gross, 2007), however the extent of cognitive reappraisal
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is not fully understood until we understand it’s role in interpretation bias. The current
study did not find significant results in interpretation bias and emotion regulation,
however, further research should be conducted in this area using different paradigms and
emotions. This would help us better understand the pervasive effect of different emotions
(e.g. anger, anxiety, etc) as well as the complete effectiveness of different emotion
regulation strategies.
Results from this study show promising implications for cognitive reappraisal and
subclinical anger on reducing explicit feelings of negativity. However, there are a few
limitations that should be noted. First, it is difficult to separate implicit emotion
regulation in this study. We used the ERQ-SF as a proxy measure for implicit emotion
regulation. That is, it measured their use of cognitive reappraisal during the mood
induction without being instructed to do so. Not surprisingly, individuals who engaged in
cognitive reappraisal during Angry autobiographical recall showed differences in
implicit, but not explicit interpretation biases. Engagement in Suppression did not have a
significant impact on implicit or explicit biases. The current model showed that instructed
cognitive reappraisal was effective in reducing negative affect following an Angry event,
which may have had a stronger effect in individuals who engaged in automatic
reappraisal during the MIP. However, the ERQ-SF only measured Cognitive Reappraisal,
and Suppression, as such it is unclear if other forms of implicit emotion regulation, such
as distraction or acceptance would influence the results.
Second, while the current interpretation bias paradigm had several strengths, it
may have been susceptible to other processes, such as social desirability and that some
items were not subtle in assessing the desired variables. For example, one item from the

49	
  
task was, ‘Today I had a good day, which means that tomorrow will probably be
_______.’. In this situation a participant may not want to be seen as overly negative, and
thus change their responses accordingly. Using other paradigms, such as a word
association task may help us understand interpretation bias without as much interference
if social desirability is playing a role.
In conclusion, the current study demonstrated that cognitive reappraisal is an
effective tool to reduce negative emotionality in angry mood states. Further, individuals
in angry mood states displayed an increasingly negative interpretation bias from baseline,
indicating that anger influences cognitions. Despite efficacy of regulating negative
emotionality in anger, cognitive reappraisal was not effective in reducing negative
interpretation bias, indicating that perhaps anger is a more difficult emotion to implicitly
modulate. Finally, the current study found that individuals who engage in automatic
cognitive reappraisal while experiencing an emotion, display less negative emotionality
and a greater positivity bias following instructed reappraisal. Further, individuals who
experience high state anger or typically struggle to engage in healthy emotion regulation
experienced greater negative emotionality and an increased negativity bias following
instructed reappraisal. Such results indicate that state and trait emotion influence
implementation of cognitive reappraisal and the resulting interpretation biases.
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Table 1

APPENDIX A: TABLES

Repeated Measures ANOVAs Evaluating Emotion Descriptor Change in Angry Induction
df
F
partial η2
Negative Emotion Descriptors
Time
1, 102 231.02** 0.69
Emotion
4, 99 23.75** 0.49
Time x Emotion 4, 99 38.78** 0.61
Positive Emotion Descriptors
Time
1, 102 127.48** 0.56
Emotion
4, 99 4.59*
0.16
Time x Emotion 4, 99 12.33** 0.33
Engagement Descriptors
Time
1, 102 1.47
0.01
Emotion
1, 102 22.48** 0.18
Time x Emotion 1, 102 20.21** 0.17
N=103
*p<.01, **p<.001
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Table 2
Repeated Measures ANOVAs Evaluating Change in Emotion Descriptors in Neutral
Induction
df

F

Negative Emotion Descriptors
Time
1, 101 4.13*
Emotion
4, 98 18.36**
Time x Emotion
4, 98 3.06*
Positive Emotion Descriptors
Time
1, 101 0.27
Emotion
4, 98 24.08**
Time x Emotion
4, 98 1.19
Engagement Descriptors
Time
1, 101 0.13
Emotion
1, 101 40.75**
Time x Emotion
1, 101 0.50
N=102
*p<.01, **p<.001

partial η2
0.04
0.43
0.11
0.00
0.50
0.05
0.00
0.29
0.01
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Table 3
Repeated Measures ANOVA Evaluating Different Interpretation Bias by MIP (Aim 1)
MIP
Response Valence
MIP x Response Valence
*p<.01, **p<.001

df
1, 95
2, 94
4, 92

F
2.021
69.64**
7.59**

partial η2
0.02
0.60
0.25
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Table 4
Repeated Measures ANOVAs Evaluating Change in Negative Affect (Aim 2)
Mood Induction
Emotion Regulation
Mood Induction x Emotion Regulation
*p<.01, **p<.001

df
F
partial η2
1, 101 122.09**
0.55
1, 101 31.57**
0.24
1, 101
8.98*
0.08
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Table 5
Repeated Measures ANOVAs Evaluating Change in Interpretation Bias and per Emotion
Regulation in the Angry condition (Aim 3)
Emotion Regulation
Response Valence
Emotion Regulation x Response Valence
*p<.01, **p<.001

df
F
partial η2
1, 102
1
0.01
2, 101 29.09**
0.37
2, 101 0.46
0.01
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Table 6
Repeated Measures ANOVAs Evaluating Change in Negative Affect (Aim 3)
Emotion Regulation
Response Valence
Emotion Regulation x Response Valence
*p<.01, **p<.001

df
F
partial η2
1, 101 1.00
0.01
2, 100 58.68**
0.54
2, 100 0.20
0.00
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Table 7
Results of regression analysis predicting Negative Affect and valenced responses after
Angry Reappraise: DERS (Aim 4)
Negative Affect (a)
Positive Bias (b)
Negative Bias (c)
Neutral Bias (d)
Variable
B SE B
β
B
SE B
β
B SE B
β
B SE B β
DERS
0.03 0.01 0.28** -0.02 0.01 -0.27** 0.02 0.01 0.29** 0.00 0.01 0.01
R2
0.08
.07
.08
0.00
2
F for change in R
8.49**
7.64**
9.15**
0.00
*p<.05, **p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 8
Results of regression analysis predicting Negative Affect and valenced responses after
Angry Reappraise: STAXI (Aim 4)
Negative Affect (a)
Variable
B
SE B
β
State Anger
0.10
0.05 0.21*
Trait Anger
-0.01 0.05 -0.03
R2
0.04
F for change in R2
2.11
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Positive Bias (b)
B
SE B
β
-0.03 0.03 -0.13
-0.03 0.03 -0.10
0.04
1.88

Negative Bias (c)
B
SE B
β
0.06 0.03 0.23*
0.03 0.03
0.13
0.09
5.09**

Neutral Bias (d)
B
SE B
β
-0.02 0.02 -0.11
-0.01 0.02 -0.05
0.02
0.94
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Table 9
Results of regression analysis predicting Negative Affect and valenced responses after
Angry Reappraise: MASQ (Aim 4)
Negative Affect (a)
Positive Bias (b)
Negative Bias (c)
Variable
B
SE B
β
B
SE B
β
B
SE B
β
General Anxiety
0.30 1.12 0.08 -0.03 0.03
-0.16
0.04 0.03
0.26
General Depression 0.06 0.03 2.46 0.01 0.02
0.05
0.02 0.02
0.13
Anxious Arousal
-0.04 0.04 -0.16 0.03 0.02
0.19
-0.04 0.02 -0.29*
Anhedonia
-0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.01 -0.33** 0.02 0.01
0.2
2
R
0.06
0.13
0.17
F for change in R2
1.48
3.67**
4.78**
*p<.05, **p<.01, *** p<.001

Neutral Bias (d)
B
SE B
β
-0.02 0.02 -0.12
-0.02 0.02 -0.19
0.02 0.02 0.13
0.02 0.01 0.22
0.05
1.15
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Table 10
Results of regression analysis predicting Negative Affect and valenced responses after
Angry Reappraise: ERQ-SF (Aim 4)
Negative Affect (a)
Positive Bias (b)
Negative Bias (c)
Variable
B
SE B
β
B
SE B
β
B
SE B
β
Reappraise
-0.15 0.08 -0.19 0.14 0.58 0.30** -0.17 0.04 -0.38***
Suppress
-0.07 0.06 0.12 -0.03 0.34
-0.08 0.00 0.03
0.00
R2
0.04
0.09
0.15
F for change in R2
2.08
4.68*
8.43***
*p<.05, **p<.01, *** p<.001

Neutral Bias (d)
B
SE B
β
0.01 0.04 0.03
0.02 0.03 0.06
0.01
0.25
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APPENDIX B: FIGURES
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Figure 1. Mean Ratings of Negative Emotion Descriptors before and after Angry MIP
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Figure 2. Mean Ratings of Positive Emotion Descriptors before and after Angry MIP
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Figure 3. Mean Ratings of Negative Emotion Descriptors before and after Neutral MIP
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Figure 4. Mean Ratings of Positive Emotion Descriptors before and after Neutral MIP
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Figure 5. Mean (95% CI) Interpretation Bias per Mood Condition (Aim 1)
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Figure 6. Mean Negative Affect Ratings per Mood Condition and Emotion Regulation
Strategy (Aim 2)
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Figure 7. Mean (95% CI) Interpretation bias in Angry Condition and Emotion Regulation
(Aim 3)
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Figure 8. Mean (95% CI) Interpretation Bias in Neutral Condition and Emotion
Regulation (Aim 3)

